How do cyclical …scal stabilisation policies a¤ect welfare and government bond risk premia? Using a new Keynesian model we …nd that the e¤ects of …scal policy rules on the bond premium and welfare crucially depend on the source of business cycle ‡uctuations. The overall e¤ect is estimated using Bayesian methods and the mechanism is deconstructed by examining the propagation mechanism of the di¤erent shocks. We …nd that the impact of …scal policy cyclicality on welfare and risk premia is highly non-linear and that these e¤ects are of a policy relevant magnitude. Finally, we …nd that the welfare cost of highly procyclical …scal policies are very large, but also excessive …scal stabilization can generate nonnegligible welfare losses.
Introduction
The crisis has returned …scal policy to center stage as a tool for macroeconomic stabilization. In particular, the lack of …scal space observed in many developed economies emphasizes the limits of discretionary …scal policy and the need to design better automatic stabilizers (e.g. Blanchard, Dell 'Ariccia, and Mauro, 2010) .
The implications of …scal rules, and more speci…cally, of the cyclicality of …scal policy rules, are however not well-established in the DSGE literature. Gali (1994) for instance studies the role of …scal stabilizers in a real business cycle model and …nds that, while government purchases have a stabilizing impact on the cycle, income taxes are destabilizing. Jones (2002) estimates …scal policy rules using U.S. data and …nds that …scal policy in general fails to reduce output volatility or shorten recessions. In the framework developed by Gordon and Leeper (2005) , countercyclical policies can even be counterproductive.
1
Moreover these studies focus on the business cycle properties and volatility of output but neglect the role of …scal rules on the cost of government …nancing. While empricical studies have found relations between …scal rules and the price of government bonds, this e¤ect has not yet been widely explored in microeconomically founded macroeconomic models.
2 From both a government …nancing perspective as well as from a welfare perspective, the bond pricing implications of …scal policy are bound to play an important role. As shown by Tallarini (2000) , the welfare e¤ects of business cycle ‡uctuations are quite di¤erent when studied in models that are able to explain asset pricing data. Very few studies have however attempted to investigate the welfare implications of automatic stabilizers in a dynamic general equilibrium model (DSGE) that is able to generate realistic bond pricing predictions. This work …lls that gap by studying the question in a New Keynesian model (e.g. Galì, Clarida and Gertler, 1999; Woodford, 2003) augmented with a novel preference speci…cation . We estimate the stance of …scal policy in a framework in which several additional sources of disturbance compete with the real-business-cycle model's technology shock in driving aggregate ‡uctuations. Our main …nding is that the e¤ects of automatic stabilizers on risk premia and welfare depend crucially on the mix of shocks hitting the economy. This result is essentially due to the tradeo¤ between output and in ‡a-tion stabilization created by markup shocks, which as in Ireland (2004) , emerge as an important contribution to movements in in ‡ation.
In terms of bond pricing implications, the e¤ects of markup shocks on risk premia can be explained by the implied co-movement of marginal utility, bond prices and in ‡ation. A contraction in aggregate supply induced by an increase in markups reduces output and bond prices but raises the in ‡ation rate. Over the business cycle, this comovement implies that in ‡ation erodes the value of long-term bonds precisely when the desire to smooth consumption is the most pressing (e.g., Rudebusch and Swanson 2012) . If markup shocks are the only source of business cycle ‡uctuations, the active use of …scal policy exacerbates in ‡ation risk since output stabilization can only be achieved by generating larger ‡uctuations in in ‡ation. In this case, we therefore …nd that a major side e¤ect of counter-cyclical …scal policy via its e¤ect on in ‡ation is to increase the premium required by investors for holding long-term bonds.
By contrast, if shocks that generate positive co-movement between in ‡ation and output are predominant, countercyclical …scal policy will stabilize output ‡uctuations and reduce the bond premium. In this case, in ‡ation acts as a hedge against business cycle ‡uctuations by increasing the value of long-term bonds in periods of recession. The favorable cyclical property of in ‡ation makes …scal policy a very e¤ective stabilization tool in that it reduces the volatility of output without increasing the risk premium on long-term bonds.
The e¤ect of the …scal policy stance on the bond premium depends on the relative strength of these two opposing e¤ects. Our estimation results suggest that the overall relationship is nonlinear and asymmetric. In particular, when the …scal policy stance is mildly procyclical, small increases in the degree of procyclicality can generate large increases in the bond premium. By contrast, the bond premium is considerably less sensitive to changes in the cyclicality of automatic stabilizers when the actual stance of …scal policy is countercyclical.
Finally, we …nd that the relationship of …scal policy stance to welfare is inverted-U-shaped, asymmetric and nonlinear. Although the welfare cost of highly procyclical …scal policy is very large, this result suggests that excessive …scal stabilization could be more costly than is usually assumed. In our framework, this latter e¤ect, which prevails when the stance of …scal policy becomes strongly countercyclical, shows that …scal policy is not an ideal tool to stabilize ‡uctuations caused by markup shocks. Intuitively, while expansionary …scal policies increase consumption and output, in models with sticky prices, they also give rise to large increases in the number of hours worked. For reasonable parameter values, this increase in labor e¤ort, which is required to …nance the expansionary …scal stance, more than o¤sets the increase in consumption. Fiscal stabilization therefore exacerbates the reduction in welfare triggered by the initial supply shock: risk premia rise, and, because the aggregate of consumption and leisure becomes more volatile, overly aggressive stabilization policies can generate sizeable welfare losses.
This paper combines two strands of literature, one focusing on the macroeconomic e¤ects of …scal policy and the other on the bond pricing implications of New Keyesian models. On the …scal side, Baxter and King (1993) augment a real business cycle model with a …scal block, to study …scal multipliers, debt dynamics and the e¤ects of distortionary taxation. Leeper, Plante and Traum (2010) and Coenen, Straub and Trabandt (2012) use Bayesian methods to estimate a DSGE model with nominal rigidities that incorporates a rich description of …scal policy. McKay and Reis (2013) study the role of …scal stabilizers in a model that merges the standard incomplete market model with the standard sticky price model of business cycles.
On the asset pricing front, Hördhal, Tristani and Vestin (2008) show that the market price of risk, a key determinant of term premia, is smaller in a New Keynesian model with nominal rigidities than in a corresponding model with ‡exible prices. Rudebusch and Swanson (2008) introduce slow moving habits (e.g. Campbell and Cochrane, 1999) into a standard New Keynesian framework and …nd that the modi…ed model can help …t the term premium but only at the cost of seriously distorting the DSGE model's ability to explain other macroeconomic variables. In a model with capital adjustment costs and habit formation, Wei (2008) …nds that, under a standard monetary policy rule, the real e¤ects of monetary policy shocks are too weak and short-lived to generate a reasonable equity premium. De Paoli, Scott and Weeken (2010) show that in a world dominated by productivity shocks, increasing nominal rigidities reduces risk premia, and their results suggest that the composition of shocks plays an important role. Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) introduce Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences into a standard New Keynesian model and …nd that this mechanism can produce a large and variable term premium without compromising the model's ability to reproduce the standard deviation of macroeconomic variables.
Swanson (2012) shows that the household's labor margin has a substantial e¤ect on risk aversion and that standard estimates of risk aversion can be misleading if the labor margin is ignored. Van Binsbergen, Fernández-Villaverde, Koijen, and Rubio-Ramirez (2013) estimate a DSGE model with Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences by maximum likelihood using the particle …lter and by computing a third-order perturbation to the equilibrium dynamics of the economy. Dew-Becker (2012) studies and estimates the bond pricing implications of a medium-scale New Keynesian model with a time-varying price of risk. Finally, Croce, Nguyen, and Schmid (2013) study …scal policy design in a neoclassical growth model and …nd that tax policies aimed at short-run stabilization may reduce average growth and welfare.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model and Section 3 discusses its estimation and evaluates the model's ability to …t stylized business cycle facts. Section 4 explains in detail what drives risk premia in the model. Section 5 studies the importance of …scal policy for the size of the bond premium and section 6 discusses the welfare implications of di¤erent …scal stabilization policies. Section 7 concludes.
The model
We present a variant of a textbook New Keynesian model (e.g. Gali, 2008) where the government collects taxes, issues long-term non-defaultable bonds, uses the proceeds to consume private goods produced by monopolistically competitive …rms, and makes lump sum transfers to households. Households consume, pay taxes, provide labour for the monopolistic …rms, trade one-period bonds, and invest in long-term bonds issued by the government. Firms hire labour from the households and produce di¤erentiated goods with identical technologies. Firms price their products subject to a pricing friction a la Calvo (1983) . Monetary and …scal authorities control the short-term nominal interest rate as well as government consumption, the labour income tax rate and lump-sum transfers, respectively.
Households
The economy is populated by representative, in…nitely-lived households who solve the following dynamic optimization problem:
where C t (i) is the quantity of good i consumed by the household in period t; P t (i) is the price of good i; N t is the quantity of labour; L t is leisure; W t is the nominal wage; B S t are nominally riskless one-period bonds (purchased at time t and maturing at t + 1), with nominal price Q S t ; B L t are nominally riskless coupon bonds with price Q L t that pay a geometrically decaying coupon in perpetuity, with decay factor c ; T R t is the lump sum component of income (transfers); t is the (time-varying) own price elasticity of demand of good i; t t is labour tax rate; X t denotes the habit stock; m is the habit stock parameter; is the discount factor; and U (.) is a concave and v(:) a convex function in its arguments (speci…ed below). E is the mathematical expectations operator. The representative agents also own the …rms, and D t is the aggregate dividend that households receive from the …nal goods-producing sector.
The …rst-order conditions with respect to bond holdings and consumption give rise to the familiar Euler equations
where U C denotes the marginal utility of consumption. Note that Q
where 1 + i t is the yield of a one-period discount bond. 3 The second Euler equation (6) is the pricing formula for government long-term bonds. The optimal choice of labour supply yields the intratemporal condition
where U N denotes the marginal disutility of labour. The representative household also 3 Note that this equation implies that, approximately, i t = log(Q S t ):
6 decides on the allocation of its consumption expenditures among di¤erentiated goods. This gives rise to the usual demand equation:
where
t is the aggregate price index, and C t denotes aggregate private consumption.
Speci…cation of utility
We assume that the utility function takes the following form (e.g. :
where is the curvature parameter of utility, C t is consumption, X t 1 is the predetermined habit stock, and where and & satisfy the usual regularity conditions. 4 The curvature parameter is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion for the composite good
The law of motion of the habit stock X t depends on the composite good, re ‡ecting the key assumption that habits are formed in respect of the aggregate of consumption and leisure. Compared to a standard speci…cation of habit formation (e.g. Abel, 1990; Constantinides, 1990; Cambpell and Cochrane, 1999) , the inclusion of leisure gives households an additional margin which can be used to control the evolution of the habit stock. The habit parameter m controls the rate at which the stock of habits depreciates, while 1 m determines the sensitivity of the reference level with respect to changes in the composite good. The second habit parameter 0 b < 1 is a measure of the importance of the habit motive in utility. 5 Given this speci…cation of utility and assuming internal habit formation, it follows that
where ' t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the habit accumulation equation.
Firms
Following the standard New Keynesian setup, we assume that there is a continuum of …rms indexed by i 2 [0; 1]: Each …rm is owned by the households, produces a di¤erenti-ated good using a homogeneous technology. Firms'production possibilities are given by the production function:
. A t represents the common level of technology that follows an AR(1) process: We assume that capital is …xed at unity. All …rms face identical isoelastic demand schedules (8) and take aggregate prices and quantities as given. We maintain the usual assumption that each …rm can re-set its price only with probability 1 : The average price duration is given by 1=(1 ): A …rm re-optimizing in period t chooses the price P t that maximizes the current market value of pro…ts generated while that price remains e¤ective, P 1 k=0 k E t fm t;t+k (P t Y t+kjt t+k Y t+kjt g subject to the demand function Y t+kjt = P t P t+k t C t+k ; for k = 0; 1; 2; :::. Note that t+k is the cost function at time t + k and Y t+kjt denotes output in period t + k for a …rm that last reset its price in period t.
The nominal stochastic discount factor from period t to period t + k is given by
The …rst-order condition can be written as: 
Pricing of long-term bonds and risk premium
The pricing of the assets in this economy is based on the households' valuation of future payo¤s of the assets, whether based on future pro…t streams of the …rms or the payment structure associated with government bonds. Future payo¤ streams are valued on the basis of the stochastic discount factor introduced in equation (12) . Following Rudebusch and Swanson (2008) , we simpli…ed the computational burden associated with the introduction of a 10-year bond by assuming that the government issues longterm, default-free bonds that pay a geometrically declining coupon in each period in perpetuity. Hence, the nominal price of the bond per one dollar of coupon in period t satis…es
where c is the rate of decay of the bond coupon and m t+1 is the (nominal) stochastic discount factor between period t and t+1. 7 The decay factor c controls the duration or maturity of the bond. When c ! 0, this bond behaves increasingly like a short-term asset, while higher values of c imply an increasing duration of the bond. The risk-free (or rather risk neutral) price of the bond is given bŷ
where i t;t+j P j s=0 i s and the second equality in equation (15) follows from the …rst- 6 The price of a default-free n-period zero coupon bond that pays one dollar at maturity satis…es
denotes the price of a bond with maturity s.
order expansion of equation (14). One commonly-used measure of the bond risk premium is based on the di¤erence between the bond's risk adjusted yield-to-maturity and risk-neutral yield-to-maturity (e.g. Swanson, 2008, 2012) . 8 The continuously-compounded yield-tomaturity i L t on the bond is given by
Correspondingly, the yield of a risk-free bond is
Hence, the implied bond risk premium is
Government
The government collects taxes, issues non-defaultable long-term bonds and uses the revenues for government consumption and transfers. There is no seigniorage. The government's (nominal) ‡ow budget constraint in this economy can be expressed as
where S t denotes the primary surplus. t ; G t and T R t denote the labour income tax rate, government consumption and lump sum net transfers respectively. In order to facilitate aggregation, we implicitly assume that the government consumes the same basket of goods as the households. B L t denotes the dollar value of long-term nominal bonds outstanding and Q L t denotes the nominal price of bonds sold at time t. Note importantly that, in contrast to one-period debt, the nominal value of debt (Q L t B L t ) depends on bond prices, which in turn depend on expected future in ‡ation. Hence, the current nominal value of debt outstanding depends on the expected path of future in ‡ation, and hence on monetary policy. In contrast to the case of a one-period bond, this implies that the nominal value of debt outstanding at time t is not predetermined.
For further use, we de…ne
as the ratio of the real value of the primary surplus to current output. As for the law of motion of government bonds, we de…ne B
as the ratio of the real value of long-term bonds to output. Then we can express the real government budget constraint as
Fiscal policy is characterized by the following feedback equations
where G Y ; D Y and denote the steady state values of the ratio of government consumption to output, the debt ratio and the labour income tax rate. " G , " t and "
T R t capture exogenous (autocorrelated) shocks in government spending, labour income taxes and 9 Note that B P Y;t and S Y;t are stationary variables such that the steady state version of (22) 
transfers.
G t ; t and T R t are unexpected (discretionary) changes to government spending, taxes and transfers and j captures the degree of serial correlation of the …scal shocks. Parameters jB ; for j = G; and T R capture the feedback of government spending, taxes and transfers on the government debt to output ratio, while jY captures the extent to which …scal policy co-moves with the business cycle, because of automatic stabilizers. In general, these feedback coe¢ cients direct (in a reduced form way) the systematic features of …scal policy. Note that transfers are lump-sum in our model and have an allocative role only through the "second-round" feedback e¤ects on labour taxes and government spending.
Finally, monetary policy is characterized by the usual interest rate feedback rule, given by
where i t N (0; 2 i ); i is the interest rate smoothing coe¢ cient and and y are the usual feedback coe¢ cients on in ‡ation and trend output gap, and t P t =P t 1 : The equilibrium real interest rate in the model is given by log(1= ). i;t captures iid shocks to monetary policy.
Market Clearing
There are three markets (goods, labour and bond markets ) that need to be in equilibrium at each point of time. We assume that the household's initial long-term bond holdings are positive such that Q L 1 B L 1 > 0, while net holdings of one-period bonds are zero in equilibrium. Market clearing in the goods market requires that at time t :
Assuming that the government decides on the allocation of its expenditures (G t ) among di¤erentiated goods similarly to the household
The market clearing condition in the labour markets requires that
Furthermore, inverting the production function Y t (i) = A t N t (i) 1 and using (30) , it 12 follows from the labour market clearing condition that:
where p;t is a measure of price dispersion across …rms. Consequently, in the symmetric equilibrium, the aggregate supply condition satis…es
See Appendix B for a description of the treatment of the price dispersion term.
Estimation
The model is estimated using Bayesian full information estimation methods as in An and Schorfheide (2007) . For our data sample, we use U.S. quarterly data from 1971Q1 to 2007Q4. As observable variables, we use consumption, in ‡ation, Federal funds rate (short-term nominal interest rate), the government consumption-to-output ratio, labour income tax revenues, and the transfers-to-output ratio. All quantity variables are linearly de-trended and measured in real terms. In ‡ation and short-term interest rate are de-meaned and expressed in annualized terms. A detailed description of the construction of the variables is provided in Appendix D. Corresponding to the six observable variables, there are six exogenous shocks: productivity shocks, government spending shocks, labour income tax shocks, transfer shocks, interest rate shocks and markup shocks. Interest rate shocks are assumed to be iid, and price mark-up shocks follow a …rst order ARMA process. All other shocks follow a …rst order process.
We estimate the model using the …rst-order Taylor approximations around the deterministic steady state, but stochastically simulate the second and third-order Taylor approximation of the model around the non-stochastic steady state in order to compute the bond risk premium and evaluate welfare. 
Calibrated parameters
The model is calibrated around a steady state with zero in ‡ation and zero growth. Note that the risk premium is zero in the deterministic steady state. 11 10 Estimation and simulations were done using Dynare, available at http://www.dynare.org; See Adjemian et al. (2011) for a detailed description.
11 In higher-order approximations the assumption on steady state in ‡ation is not innocuous (e.g, Ascari and Rossi, 2011) . To avoid possible repercussions of mean in ‡ation on the determination of Table 1 (2010), we target the …scal variables relevant for the federal government. These, together with other parameters of the model, imply that the steady state labour income tax rate is 0:23 and the steady state primary surplus-to-output ratio S Y is 0:003.
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c is set at 0:9848; following Swanson (2008, 2012) . This implies a Macaulay duration for the government bond of 10 years (40 quarters). 13 The discount rate is set at 0:997, which is a standard value used in the literature. 
Regarding labour supply, we …rstly choose such that the representative household devotes 20% of its time to market activities in the model's steady state, i:e: N = 0:2. Normalizing the total time endowment to 1, this implies a steady state value for leisure of L = 0:8. With this speci…cation of preference, the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, denoted e F ; depends not only on & but also on the value of the two habit parameters. An approximate closed form expression for the Frisch elasticity can be derived by log-linearizing the model's …rst-order conditions 14 yielding
the risk premium we calibrate the model around a zero in ‡ation steady state. When estimating the model we bridge the di¤erence between the means implied by data and by the model via suitable measurement equations. 12 See Appendix D for exact de…nitions of the variables and other details of the data. 13 Macaulay duration is a measure of the average length of time for which money is invested, where the present values of each coupon payment are used to construct the average. The formula is D = P m t=1 tCt (1+it) t =Q, where D denotes the Macaulay duration of the bond, m is the maturity, i is the yield and Q is the price of the bond. In the case of continuous compounding D = P m t=1 tC t exp( it)=Q: 14 See Jaccard (2013) for a more detailed analysis of the impact of this speci…cation of habits on the Frisch and wealth elasticities of labor supply.
Setting the second labour supply parameter, &; at 1:66 and the curvature coe¢ cient at 1 ensures that the Frisch elasticity will be in line with values considered plausible in the literature for the range of parameter values for m and b that allow the model to generate a reasonable bond premium. 15 As for the supply side of the model, we set the steady state price markup at 20%. This is achieved by setting the price elasticity of demand to 6 in the model's steady state. The production function curvature parameter is set to unity. All remaining parameters are estimated. Priors are reported in Table A1 . We set the Calvo parameter at 0.5, implying an average contract duration of 2 quarters. The priors on the two habit formation parameter are 0.6 and 0.9. For the interest rate rule we start with a Taylor-type rule with an in ‡ation response coe¢ cient of 2 and an output response coe¢ cient of 0.5. The interest rate smoothing parameter is set at 0.7. These are all quite standard calibrations. Concerning the …scal rules we set the response to debt at 0.03 for taxes and for expenditures, and at 0.015 for transfers. Our prior on the cyclical response coe¢ cient is 0.0 for expenditures. A negative coe¢ cient for this parameter implies that …scal policy is procyclical. All priors on the shock persistence are 0.7. The priors on the standard deviations of the innovations are calibrated to roughly reproduce the variances of the observable variables. The remaining parameter values are reported in Table A1 .
Estimation results
The estimation results are reported in Table A1 of the appendix. The estimation results in the posterior mode column give the values of the structural parameters obtained from the maximized log posterior distribution with respect to the model parameters. The next column gives the respective standard deviations. The second set of results gives the mean and 5th and 95th percentiles of the posterior distribution obtained from the Metropolis-Hastings sampling algorithm based on 700,000 draws.
Turning to the parameter estimates we …nd that most of them are in line with comparable studies. On the household side the sensitivity of habits to overall utility b is estimated at 0:841; implying an important contribution of habit formation to overall utility. The depreciation of the habit level m is estimated to be 0:903, pointing towards a considerable degree of memory in the habit formation process, yet this parameter is rather poorly identi…ed. The speci…c form of our utility makes it di¢ cult to compare these estimates directly with previous studies. The estimation of the Calvo parameter implies an average price duration of 9 quarters, which is on the high side but in line with the results of comparable studies.
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Turning to the policy rules and starting with the monetary policy rule our estimates are in line with Smets and Wouters (2007) . We …nd a somewhat stronger response of interest rates to in ‡ation and a weaker response to the output level, but it is important to note that Smets and Wouters have an additional term on the change in output.
On the …scal side the comparison to other studies is less straightforward. The paper by Leeper, Plante and Traum (2010) is closest to our approach, because they also relate …scal instruments to output and debt, and we use an equivalent dataset for …scal variables. The estimated coe¢ cients, however, are not directly comparable because the de…nitions of explanatory variables are di¤erent. The signs of estimated coe¢ cients are the same in both studies, but we …nd a somewhat stronger role for cyclical elements.
Model performance
The theoretical business cycle moments are generated by simulating the model with all six shocks using the set of estimated and calibrated parameter values reported in Tables 1 and A1 . The simulation results reported in Table A2 of the appendix, are obtained by resorting to a second or third-order approximation of the policy function (e.g. Adjemian et al., 2011). 17 16 Following Eichenbaum and Fisher (2007) , Smets and Wouters use a Kimball aggregator to overcome the problem of large estimates for the price duration parameter that commonly arises in DSGE models. The reduced form estimate of the Phillips Curve coe¢ cients in Smets and Wouters is however close to our estimate. 17 In Christo¤el, Jaccard and Kilponen (2011) we check the accuracy of the approximation by comparing the value provided by the approximation with the exact value derived from the relevant Euler equation, where expectations are approximated by numerical integration.
Compared to a standard New Keynesian model, the main improvement is that our model augmented with slow-moving habits regarding the composite good is able to generate a bond premium exceeding eighty basis points. This relative improvement is obtained in a model that is able to closely match the volatility of consumption and broadly captures the co-movement between the main macroeconomic variables and consumption.
The risk-free rate generated by the model is on average higher and slightly more volatile than the value found in the data, which is computed from a post-war sample. The low mean risk-free rate that we obtain is however consistent with values considered plausible in the literature (e.g. Weil, 1989) . For instance, using a sample that includes pre-war data, Piazzesi, Schneider and Tuzel (2007) report an empirical mean and riskfree rate standard deviation of respectively 0.75% and 3.68%. Despite the introduction of a large number of shocks, our simpli…ed model cannot match the volatility of output, which is about fourty percent smaller than in the data. At the same time, the model is able to reproduce the volatility of consumption and of the government spendingto-output ratio, as well as their co-movement, which are the two aggregate demand components that have been introduced.
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As shown by Rudebusch and Swanson (2008) , including standard speci…cations of habits in New Keynesian models can help …t the term premium but only by seriously distorting the DSGE model's ability to explain other macroeconomic variables. By contrast, the results presented in Table A2 suggest that introducing this particular speci…cation of habits o¤ers a potential solution to several of the problems that have been documented in the literature. Overall, this mechanism helps to bring the asset pricing predictions of a standard New Keynesian model into closer conformity with the data and this relative success does not come at the cost of generating extreme ‡uctuations in other macroeconomic variables. Moreover, this result is obtained with parameter values that are estimated using macroeconomic variables and without resorting to a procedure that maximizes the model's ability to replicate a speci…c value for the bond premium.
The role of price stickiness. In terms of asset pricing implications, compared to the mechanism described in in the context of a real business cycle model, the main di¤erence is the role played by in ‡ation. Figure A1 (see Appendix A) illustrates how a variation in the degree of price stickiness a¤ects the asset pricing implications of our New Keynesian model. Increasing the Calvo parameter reduces the bond premium because, with this price-setting mechanism, more rigid prices lead to a reduction in in ‡ation volatility. In the model estimated with all shocks, the fact that a reduction in in ‡ation volatility reduces the bond premium illustrates that price changes are a signi…cant source of risk in our economy. As shown by the negative relationship between the bond premium and the Calvo parameter, nominal rigidities therefore serve as insurance against in ‡ation risk by reducing the uncertainty caused by price changes.
The e¤ect of in ‡ation on the bond premium depends on the co-movement generated by the di¤erent shocks. In the case of pure demand shocks, like monetary policy shocks, the cyclical behaviour of in ‡ation provides a hedge against business cycle ‡uctuations by increasing the real value of bond holdings during periods of recession. In the case of pure supply shocks, by contrast, the fact that recessions are in ‡ationary exacerbates the e¤ects of negative shocks on bond holders, who see their asset holdings eroded by in ‡ation during periods of economic contraction.
As illustrated by Figure A1 , our estimation results suggest that the quantitative magnitude of the insurance motive induced by pure demand shocks is however small. In our sample, the dynamics of in ‡ation are driven primarily by supply shocks, which implies that in ‡ation erodes the value of long-term bonds precisely when the desire to smooth consumption is most pressing, which is consistent with the …ndings of and Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) .
What drives the risk premium?
In this section, we employ variance decomposition, to …rst identify the main drivers of economic ‡uctuations and then to study how the shock-induced co-movements between the di¤erent variables a¤ect the bond premium.
In this economy, about eighty …ve percent of the historical variance of output is explained by technology and government expenditure shocks (see Table A3 in Appendix). The other components of …scal policy, namely tax and transfer shocks, have a negligible impact on the dynamics of both macroeconomic and …nancial variables. Technology shocks alone explain thirty seven percent of the total variance of output, and in ‡ation is largely driven by markup shocks. Technology shocks and government and markup shocks explain most of the variance in bond prices. Finally, as shown by the decomposition reported in Table A4 , markup and technology shocks explain more than eighty percent of the mean bond premium. The model therefore generates a 0.72% bond premium when simulated with technology and markup shocks as the only sources of business cycle ‡uctuations.
Impulse response analysis. The mean bond premium and the dynamics of bond prices are largely driven by markup shocks (See Tables A3 and A4 ). As shown by the impulse response analysis presented in Figure A2 , the importance of these shocks can be explained by the co-movements they generate between di¤erent macroeconomic variables. By increasing the substitutability between the di¤erent varieties of goods, a positive shock reduces the price markup and temporarily improves the …rms'e¢ ciency. As in the real business cycle model, agents take advantage of higher wages to work harder and smooth the variation of the composite good by increasing consumption. The increase in consumption dominates the decline in leisure, leading to a smooth increase in the value of the composite good, as shown in Figure A2 . Consequently, the reduction in price markup has a positive e¤ect on households, whose living standards temporarily improve.
As re ‡ected by the negative co-movement between in ‡ation and output, markup shocks work like supply shocks. For standard values of the monetary policy rule parameters, the decline in in ‡ation due to the lower markup triggers a reduction in interest rates that further stimulates output and raises bond prices. The capital gain due to this increase in market value is therefore ampli…ed by the decline in in ‡ation, which contributes to increases in the real value of bonds during boom periods. Likewise, adverse markup shocks are particularly painful for bond investors since higher in ‡ation ampli…es the capital losses that they su¤er during periods of recession.
In terms of bond pricing implications, the co-movement generated by technology and markup shocks are very similar (see Figure A3) . As in the case of markup shocks, technology shocks generate a negative co-movement between in ‡ation and the value of composite good, which in our environment is the relevant metric for the determination of asset prices. As can be seen by comparing the north-west panels of Figures 3 and 4 , the macroeconomic implications of the two types of shocks are however very di¤erent. In contrast to markup shocks, positive technology shocks lead to a reduction in hours worked (e.g. Smets and Wouters, 2007) .
Finally, as shown by Figure A4 , the positive co-movement between in ‡ation and the value of composite good generated by monetary policy shocks helps to hedge bond investors against in ‡ation risk. The positive co-movement between the value of composite good and bond prices still means that holding bonds is risky since bond holders will su¤er capital losses in periods of recession, when the value of composite good is low. But if the recession is induced by a monetary policy shock, the capital loss due to a decline in bond prices will be partially o¤set by a decline in in ‡ation. This in‡ation limits the risk of holding nominal bonds and explains the small contribution of monetary policy shocks to the overall bond premium reported in Table A4 . Time-variation in the bond premium. As illustrated by the last column of Table A5 , the model estimated with all shocks generates a negative correlation between the bond premium and output and is therefore able to reproduce the fact that risk premia are generally higher during recessions (e.g. Fama and French, 1989; Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2005; Piazzesi and Swanson, 2008) . The model simulations shown in Table  A5 , which reports the individual contributions of shocks to the overall result, illustrate that the countercyclical movements in the bond premium are essentially driven by markup shocks. Given that technology and …scal policy shocks generate procyclical movements in the bond premium, the model without markup shocks would not be able to reproduce this key business cycle correlation, which is 0.55 in the model estimated with all shocks except markup shocks.
Asset pricing implications of …scal stabilization policies
The role of …scal policy can be studied by investigating how changes in the parameters that control the evolution of government spending a¤ect the bond premium. In this section, we focus on the …scal rule parameters that govern the government consumptionto-output ratio, since as illustrated by the variance decomposition shown in Table A3 , this is the component of …scal policy that has the largest impact on the dynamics of macroeconomic and …nancial variables. As discussed in section 2.5, we estimated the following …scal rule,
where the cyclicality of …scal policy is given by the parameter, GY ; which measures the sensitivity of the government spending-to-output ratio to deviations of output, Y t ; from its steady state value, Y : The estimated value GY = 0:305 indicates that in the period considered, …scal policy in the United States was on average mildly countercyclical. The small value found for GB suggests that the debt-to-output ratio did not have a signi…cant in ‡uence on the reaction function of the …scal authorities in this particular time period. We therefore concentrate the analysis on the role played by GY :
The sensitivity of the bond premium to GY is analyzed in Figure 1 below. The continuous blue line shows how a variation in the cyclicality of …scal policy a¤ects the bond premium in the model estimated with all shocks. The blue squares, the red diamonds, and the green circles show the individual contributions of respectively technology, markup and government spending shocks to the overall sensitivity of the bond premium with respect to a change in the …scal rule parameter, GY : The non-linear relationship between bond premium and the …scal rule parameter depicted by the blue continuous line summarizes the model's main asset pricing prediction. Compared to the estimated …scal policy stance, a marginal increase in procyclicality of …scal policy, which in our environment corresponds to values for GY below 0.305, has a negative e¤ect on the bond premium. But as long as the variation from the estimated value is small, the quantitative magnitude of this e¤ect remains modest. For larger increases in procyclicality, however, the sign of this e¤ect changes and its magnitude becomes sizeable. For values smaller than -0.1, this relationship becomes highly nonlinear, and a small increase in the procyclicality of …scal policy generates a large increase in the bond premium.
Exogenous changes in the cyclicality of …scal policy. We can gain insight into what features of the model give rise to this non-linear relationship by …rstly examining how exogenous changes in the stance of …scal policy a¤ect the dynamics of macroeconomic and …nancial variables. Figure A5 below shows the response of output, hours worked, consumption, the composite good, bond prices, and in ‡ation to a positive government spending shock. In our model, the e¤ects of government spending shocks are very similar to the prediction of a standard IS-LM textbook model. Output, hours worked and consumption increase and the rise in in ‡ation generated by the positive aggregate demand shock triggers a monetary policy tightening.
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In terms of asset pricing, although a positive shock generates a rise in consumption and output, key is that an increase in government spending reduces the composite good, and therefore generates an increase in agents'marginal utility. The fall in the composite good increases agents' risk aversion and leads to an increase in the bond premium, which explains the positive correlation between the risk premium and output generated by government spending shocks reported in Table A5 . In sum, while positive government spending shocks increase consumption and output, the key is that they imply an increase in labor e¤ort that is too large compared to the increase in consumption that they generate. In other words, agents dislike boom periods that are induced by expansionary …scal policies because they come at the cost of a decline in living standards.
How does the …scal policy stance a¤ect the transmission of macroeconomic shocks? As illustrated the decomposition shown in Figure 1 , the relationship between bond premium and …scal rule parameter depends crucially on the nature of economic ‡uctuations. In particular, an increase in the level of procyclicality unambiguously reduces the bond premium when the only shocks are markup shocks. By contrast, if government spending or technology shocks are the only drivers of business cycle ‡uctuations, a more procyclical …scal policy stance would always generate higher risk premia.
The positive relationship induced by markup shocks is better understood by examining the impulse response shown in Figure A2 . First, a reduction in price markup increases output and the value of composite good while lowering the in ‡ation rate. For positive values of GY ; a countercyclical …scal policy triggers a reduction in government spending. As discussed above, a reduction in government spending lowers output and in ‡ation but generates an increase in the value of composite good. Therefore, in the case of markup shocks, while countercyclical …scal policy helps to contain the increase in output, it exacerbates the ‡uctuations in the value of composite good and in ‡ation.
From the standpoint of the representative agent, the side e¤ect of macroeconomic stabilization is therefore to make smoothing of the composite good more di¢ cult to achieve. In terms of asset pricing implications, the larger ‡uctuations in marginal utility serve to amplify the positive co-movement between bond prices and the composite good, which implies that agents will su¤er a capital loss precisely when they fear it most. In our setting, this stronger co-movement makes bond holding less attractive and so generates a higher risk premium.
The e¤ect of the cyclicality of …scal policy on this relationship is ampli…ed by in ‡a-tion risk which as demonstrated in section 4, is a key determinant of the bond premium. In the case discussed above, the countercyclical stance of …scal policy triggers a decline in government expenditures that exacerbates the de ‡ationary pressure induced by the positive supply shock. The in ‡ation e¤ect therefore works in the same direction and contributes to a positive relationship between bond premium and …scal rule parameter,
GY :
The overall shape of this relationship, which is depicted by the blue continuous line, is dominated by the co-movement induced by government spending and technology shocks, which explain about 85 percent of the total variance of output. In contrast to markup shocks, key here is that these two shocks generate both negative co-movement between output and the composite good as well as positive co-movement between output and in ‡ation. In this case, adopting a more procyclical …scal policy stance increases the volatility of the composite good and in ‡ation, which leads to a potentially sizeable increase in risk premia. Since in this case procyclical …scal policy also ampli…es output volatility, the nonlinear e¤ect on the bond premium can be explained by the unsustainable dynamics that such a policy may induce when macroeconomic ‡uctuations are driven by these types of shocks.
In terms of co-movement, the e¤ects of technology shocks on the main macroeconomic aggregates that we obtain are very similar to the e¤ects of a demand shock. While the negative response of hours induced by positive technology shocks is a standard feature of New Keynesian models, the main di¤erence is that in our environment they generate a reduction in labor demand that is stronger than usual. In particular, this reduction in labor demand, which leads to a decline in real wages, is su¢ ciently large to generate a short-lived contraction in output (e.g. Basu, Fernald and Kimball, 2006) . As can be seen by comparing the impulse responses shown in Figures 4 and 7 , the e¤ects of a contractionary technology shock are therefore very similar to those of a decline in government spending.
Welfare implications of stabilization policies
Finally, Figure 2 below shows how a change in the policy stance, as measured by changes in GY , a¤ects total welfare in this economy. 20 The y axis measures the annualized variation in welfare that would be obtained by changing GY from its estimated value. As shown by the continuous blue line, which depicts the overall e¤ect obtained in the model estimated with all shocks, the relationship between …scal policy and welfare is highly nonlinear. Compared to the estimated …scal rule; an increase in GY from 0:305 to 0.5, which implies more countercyclical …scal policy stance, generates a decline in lifetime utility of about 0.4 percent. By contrast, for values of GY between 0.305 and -0.2, an increase in welfare, which can reach 0.5 percent of lifetime utility, can be obtained by adopting a more procyclical stance. For values of GY lower than -0.2, however, the direction of the e¤ect changes abruptly and the relationship becomes highly nonlinear. Once this threshold is crossed, any further increase in the degree of procyclicality generates a welfare loss that may exceed three percent of lifetime utility. 20 Welfare is given by
Figure 2: Fiscal policy stance and welfare.
The overall shape depicted by the blue continuous line can be explained by the relative contribution of the di¤erent shocks. For instance, as shown by the red diamonds, adopting a more countercyclical …scal policy always reduces welfare when markup shocks are the only source of business cycle ‡uctuations. By contrast, if technology or government spending shocks are the only sources of shocks, adopting a more countercyclical …scal policy stance is always welfare improving.
The overall shape of this relationship can be better understood by examining how a change in the cyclicality of …scal policy a¤ects the volatility of the composite good and in ‡ation. The left panel of Figure 3 , which shows the impact of GY on p;t , illustrates that the e¤ect of strongly procyclical …scal policy on welfare works mainly through its e¤ect on the price dispersion term. For small values of GY ; …scal policy becomes strongly procyclical and generates extreme ‡uctuations in in ‡ation. In New Keynesian models, the introduction of price stickiness creates a link between in ‡ation volatility and welfare, which can be illustrated by the usual second-order Taylor approximation to p;t (e.g., Gali, 2008) :
Since the price dispersion term directly enters the production function, in ‡ation volatility has a direct e¤ect on welfare that can be captured by a solution method that computes a second or a third-order perturbation to the equilibrium dynamics of the economy (e.g. Adjemian et al., 2012) . The price dispersion e¤ect cannot, however, explain the inverted U-shape depicted by the blue continuous line. For values of GY greater than zero, the relationship depicted by the red diamonds ‡attens out, which shows that in ‡ation volatility cannot account for the negative e¤ect of countercyclical …scal policy on welfare observed for this particular range of parameter values. As illustrated by the right panel of Figure  3 , this e¤ect is rather due to the volatility of the composite good, whose volatility increases with the degree of countercyclicality of …scal policy for values of GY greater than -0.2.
In sum, the overall shape of the blue continuous line shown in Figure 2 can …rstly be explained by the in ‡ation e¤ect, which dominates for small values of GY ; implying a strongly procyclical …scal stance. Second, for values of GY greater than -0.1, the particular co-movement generated by markup shocks implies that countercyclical …scal policy hampers smoothing of the composite good. For higher degrees of countercyclicality, this latter e¤ect dominates, and excessive …scal stabilization can become counterproductive. Compared to the estimated value, increasing GY to 0.8 would for instance cause a decline in welfare of about one percent.
Conclusions
The e¤ects of …scal stabilization on welfare and government bond pricing in a general equilibrium context have not yet been studied widely. Against the background of …scal stabilization being at the center stage of academic and the public debate since the global …nancial crises, the failure of standard DSGE model to adress these questions is quite apparent. We present a sticky price general equilibrium model which allows us to analyse the interaction between …scal stabilisation policy, bond risk premia and welfare. We have confronted the model with the data by estimating it via standard Baysian methods. In the model, the ‡uctuations in bond prices and bond risk premia over the business cycle are explained by ‡uctuations in the nominal stochastic discount factor, which in turn is driven by demand and supply shocks.
If the shocks that drive output and in ‡ation in di¤erent directions (such as markup shocks) are the only source of business cycle ‡uctuations, …scal stabilization policy exacerbates in ‡ation risk and bond risk premia increase. More stable output, due to countercyclical …scal policy, comes at the cost of more volatile in ‡ation. In this case, active …scal stabilization policy increases the bond risk premium and reduces welfare. In contrast, if demand shocks that generate positive co-movement between in ‡ation and output are predominant, active …scal stabilization policy leads to less volatile output. In this case, in ‡ation acts as a hedge against business cycle ‡uctuations by increasing the value of long-term bonds in periods of recession. This reduces the bond premium and increases welfare. These two opposing e¤ects mean that, overall, the merits of …scal stabilisation depend on what is driving the business cycle.
Our estimation results suggest when the …scal policy stance is initially mildly procyclical, small increases in the degree of procyclicality can generate large increases in the bond premium. The welfare costs of highly procyclical …scal policy are also very large. By contrast, the bond premium is considerably less sensitive to changes in the cyclicality of …scal policy when the initial stance of policy is countercyclical. Finally, excessive …scal stabilization can also generate non-negligible welfare losses, suggesting that excessive …scal stabilization could be more costly than is usually assumed. 
25.6 5.1 9.7 58.1 1.5 Note: Based on a third-order approximation and a sample of 15'000 observations.
B Price dispersion and real marginal costs
The price dispersion term is small up to the …rst-order approximation (e.g. Gali, 2008) , so it is usually dropped from the log linear approximation of the aggregate production function. However, since we work on higher-order approximations, we de…ne
gives the aggregate in ‡ation dynamics. In the non-stochastic steady state, P;t = 1 under the assumption that price level is constant in the steady state (e.g. Gali 2008, ch. 3) .
The equilibrium also entails the derivation of an individual …rm's marginal cost in terms of the economy's average real marginal cost to be used in the evaluation of optimal price setting condition. It can be shown that MC t+kjt = P t P t+k t 1 MC t+k and where MC t+k denotes the economy's average real marginal cost, de…ned as
M P N t+k denotes the economy's average marginal productivity of labour and the real wage W t+k =P t+k is evaluated according to the intratemporal condition from the household's problem (7).
C Dynamic model equations
Recursive representation of the optimal pricing equation:
(36) 
Price dispersion:
Short-term bond pricing equation:
Yield of short-term bond:
Marginal utility of consumption:
Evolution of habit stock:
Evolution of Lagrange multiplier associated with habit stock:
Intratemporal condition:
(1 t t ) U C;t w t = (C t ( + (1 N t ) & ) bX t 1 )
Economy.wide real marginal costs:
Long-term bond pricing equations (risk-neutral price and risk-adjusted price):
Long-term bond yields (risk-neutral yield and risk-adjusted yield):
Bond premium:
Excess holding return:
Government real budget constraint: 
Primary surplus-to-output ratio:
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Aggregate output:
Consumption-to-output ratio:
Consumption:
Fiscal rules (Government consumption, labour income tax rate, lump-sum transfers):
Real value of government debt outstanding:
Monetary policy rule:
Exogenous shocks processes: N: Hours, measure of labour input. This is computed as N = H (1 U=100); where H and U are the average over monthly series of hours and unemployment. Source: Bureau of Labour Statistics, series LNU02033120 for hours and LNS14000000 for unemployment.
INT: Net interest payments of federal government debt. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Nipa Table 3 TAXR: Total federal tax revenues. This is computed as TAXR = current tax receipts (line 2)+contributions for government social insurance (line 11). Source: BEA, Nipa Table 3 .2.
S : Primary surplus. This is computed as S t = T AXR t (G t + T R t ); where G t is government consumption, T R t are net transfers and T AXR t are total federal tax revenues.
D: Federal government debt. This is computed as D t = D t 1 + IN T t S t (M t M t 1 ); where S t is primary surplus IN T t are net interest payments of federal government debt and M t M t 1 is seignorage. The initial value of debt is set equal to the market value of Gross Federal Debt in March 1955. Source: BEA, Nipa : Average e¤ective labour income tax rate. Computed following Jones (2002) and Leeper, Plante and Traum (2010) .
LTAXR: Labour tax revenues. This is computed as LT AXR t = t W N t ; where W N t denotes labour income tax base (Nipa Table, Swanson (2008, 2012) .
